Abstract. Does it matter who pays for ratings? Yes, but not for the rating agencies' behavior. These are the findings of our experiment where we analyze the effect of the remuneration model of rating agencies on their assessments as well as on investors' and issuers' behavior. First, we find that rating agencies' assessments are comparable whether the agency is (partially) paid by issuers, investors or solely by the experimenter. Issuers, on the other hand, more often do not return investor's trust when they or investors pay for ratings. Further, investors more often act according to the agencies' recommendations when they have to pay for this information.
INTRODUCTION
Rating agencies have existed and issued ratings for more than one century. According to Berblinger (1996) , ratings comprise the rating agencies' opinions on the future ability of an issuer to fulfill his payments (interest and repayment) timely and entirely. Until the 1970s, investors paid rating agencies for their services and received their assessments as exclusive information. Nowadays, rating agencies are mostly paid by issuers of financial products and only few small agencies receive their revenues from investors. Due to their inglorious role in the recent financial crisis, some experts call for drastic changes in the remuneration structure of rating agencies because especially the issuer-pays model carries conflicts of interest. Some even advocate the nationalization of rating agencies, which would de facto lead to ratings that are publicly financed.
Ratings can be subdivided into two classes depending on the subject to be rated (see, e.g., Standard & Poor's, 2012, p. 3ff.) . On one hand, there are the socalled issuer ratings which focus on the companies (e.g., banks, insurances, industrial firms) or governments and municipalities which have issued or are planning to issue a financial product. On the other hand, there are the so-called issue ratings which account for particular financial products, primarily debt instruments such as bonds. The rating of structured financial products like Asset Backed Securities (ABS) is even more difficult than rating 'plain vanilla' debt instruments because of the complex underlying financial mathematical models. The rating process is quite different depending on the abovementioned criteria and financial products and is not made public in detail. However, potential conflicts of interest can arise in any of the abovementioned cases. In light of agency theory, they are more severe in the issuer-pays model, where the rating agency is paid by the issuer, than in the investor-pays model. Thus, some experts call for a revival of the investor-pays model, for more regulatory restrictions regarding the way rating agencies get paid by the issuers, and for more disclosure (Pagano and Volpin, 2010) .
In the United States, almost all companies which operate in the financial market are rated externally by at least one of the three best reputed American agencies: Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's and Fitch. Together, they have a market share of almost 95% with regard to revenues and more than 96% concerning the number of ratings (SEC, 2013, p. 10) . They played a focal role in the rise and spreading of the financial crisis that started in 2007 which also facilitated the emergence of the recent Eurozone crisis. Before the financial crisis, rating agencies assigned investment grade ratings to financial products with a complex structure such as ABS that were in most cases secured with US subprime mortgages. When the US real estate market broke down, the agencies had to withdraw these ratings that were 'too positive', thereby triggering fire sales of the respective products. Most interestingly, the agencies did not merely rate these products but also helped to create them. Therefore, conflicts of interest seem to be most severe in this specific case.
Criticism of rating agencies exists as long as rating agencies themselves. For example, the concern about procyclicality of ratings was already mentioned by Hickman in 1944. According to Sylla (2002, p. 29) , he specifically worried 'about the cyclical behavior of ratings upgrades in good times and downgrades in bad times when they happened to be used in conjunction with financial regulation'. However, with regard to sovereign ratings Gaillard (2013) found that credit ratings were more stable than market-based indicators such as credit default swap-implied ratings (CDS-IRs). He does not deny that rating agencies played a procyclical role in the financial crisis from 2009 until 2012 but states that this role could have been much more severe if market-based indicators had been taken into account instead of sovereign ratings by the big three. Moreover, he found that sovereign ratings published by Moody's even had countercyclical effects, and therefore functioned as a protection shield against contagion. Fight (2001) criticized the oligopoly status of the major Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) they obtained through the regulatory use of ratings. Due to this and the unclear rules of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding the recognition of agencies as NRSROs, market entry for small agencies is almost impossible. In contrast, Camanho et al. (2012) developed a model in which rating inflation is more severe in the case of competition than in the monopoly case, subsequently leading to a decrease in expected welfare.
Another research focus is on the remuneration model. Until the 1970s, investors paid for rating agencies' assessments. Nowadays, rating agencies are paid by issuers. This leads to potential conflicts of interest. Especially in the case of structured financial products, banks often directly discuss with rating agencies how to optimally design financial products so as to receive certain investment grade evaluations (Cantor and Packer, 1994, p. 19) . These auxiliary services offered by rating agencies as well as their involvement in the early stages of the process of rating structured financial products carry enormous risks of conflicts of interest (Johansson, 2010, p. 5) . Sean Egan, cofounder of Egan-Jones Ratings Co. whose company charges investors for ratings, states that '[u] nder the issuer-paid business model, a rating agency which does not come in with the highest rating will, before long, be an unemployed ratings firm' (Westbrook, 2009 ). As mentioned above, the rating process is quite different depending on the underlying assets, the kind of issuer and the time horizon. However, the basic principal-agent-constellation between the issuer, the investor and the rating agency is comparable in all settings and thus potential conflicts of interest exist in all rating processes.
Against this background, we experimentally compared the issuer-pays and the investor-pays remuneration model with a baseline in which the rating agency is paid publicly, i.e., by the experimenter. The first two models have already been applied in practice while the third model, the 'public-pays' variant has not been put to test before. Moreover, until today only very little empirical evidence exists which speaks either for the issuer-pays or the investor-pays model (Jiang et al., 2012) . The empirical study conducted by Jiang et al. (2012) suggests that the issuer-pays model as we know it today might contribute to higher (i.e., better) ratings on average. They analyze a short time span in the 1970s where Moody's had already adopted the issuer-pays model while S&P still charged investors. In this short period, S&P's ratings were lower on average for the same corporate bonds, whereas they significantly increased when S&P began to charge issuers of the respective bonds.
Given these facts, our paper contributes in an innovative way to the heated discussion concerning the role of rating agencies in the financial crisis with a focus on their remuneration. We deliver empirical evidence from an experiment where the three respective models were tested. We analyzed the agencies', investors' and issuers' behavior in a trust game with third party assessment and potential conflicts of interest. Our approach mainly resembles the experimental design used by Kataria and Winter (2013) who tested the effect of promises and incentives on assessments by adding a third player, the 'assessor', to a binary trust game. In our experimental study, we simulate a simple constellation of an issuer rating where a company ('participant B') issues a bond, is then evaluated by a third party ('participant C'), the rating agency, and finally seeks an investor ('participant A') who knows about the rating agency's assessment. The rating agency is able to assess the issuer as these players have worked together in a seminar group for two months beforehand. This set-up is intuitive and understandable for most participants while simulating the striking and most important relationships between issuers, investors and rating agencies with reduced complexity. Although the rating of ABS implies the most severe conflicts of interest, this process cannot be easily simulated due to its complexity. Thus, we decided to focus on the three abovementioned remuneration models.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 comprises literature that focuses on the investor-and the issuer-pays model as well as on the potential conflicts of interest in these models. Section 3 deals with our experimental set-up and the results of our experiments, which are also discussed. In Section 4, we call attention to the implications of our findings and give an outlook for possible future research in this field.
C. B€ uhren and M. Pleßner
LITERATURE OVERVIEW
'Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? ' Jiang et al. (2012) (Jiang et al., 2012, p. 609) . By comparing corporate bond ratings from the two biggest and best reputed agencies in these almost four years, Jiang and his coauthors succeeded in showing that when S&P charged investors while Moody's already charged issuers, Moody's ratings were higher than S&P's on average. In the years after the transition (August 1974-78) , however, S&P's ratings substantially increased and could no longer be distinguished from Moody's judgments. This is a clear indicator that the issuer-pays remuneration model might induce more favorable ratings for issuers on average. Hill (2004, p. 50) attributes this change in the remuneration model to the rise of photocopying (see also Cantor and Packer, 1994, p. 3) . The fax also contributed to this development. Xerox introduced the Xerox 914 in 1959 and the Magnafax Telecopier in 1966, making it notably easier for subscribers to share or even resell their information which in turn led to a considerable free rider problem (Jiang et al., 2012, p. 609) . Duff (2009) states that investors' willingness to pay for external ratings faded when they became capable of performing the respective evaluations themselves. To avoid the erosion of revenues, agencies switched to the issuer-pays remuneration model which is still in force. Thereby, they generate most of their revenues from the issuers of bonds and financial products they rate. Besides the rise of photocopying and the fax machine, White (2010) offers three more explanations for this change.
First, he refers to the breakdown of Penn-Central Railroad in the year 1970. This event galvanized investors as well as issuers. The latter then wanted to convince investors of their creditworthiness, leading to a willingness to pay the rating agencies for evaluating their risk (Fridson, 1999; cited in White, 2010, p. 214) . Cantor and Packer (1994, p. 4) also regard this historical default on $82 million of commercial paper as a 'catalyst in the transition to charging issuers'. Second, the rating agencies themselves understood that issuers of bonds were dependent on their seal of quality due to financial regulation (White, 2010, p. 215) . Without a positive signal of at least one of the 'big three', no institutional investor was allowed to buy a bond. Third, he describes the bond rating market as a two-sided market (White, 2010, p. 215) . Thus, revenues can be earned from issuers as well as from investors. He compares the rating market with markets of newspapers where the remuneration models can either focus on subscription fees or advertising revenues. Most newspapers practice a mix of these models, thereby generating revenues from both sides of the market.
In the issuer-pays as well as in the investor-pays remuneration model, there are potential conflicts of interest. Figure 1 visualizes the relationship between investor, issuer and rating agency for both remuneration models (see Mork€ otter figure) . The conflicts of interest in this relationship can be analyzed with the aid of principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . In general, this theory models the relationship between a client (principal) and a commissioner (agent), who has a certain leeway in decision making and is thus capable of influencing the principal's welfare.
The notable asymmetry in information and the corresponding principal-agent problems between investors and issuers (1) are the main reasons for the necessity of rating agencies as financial intermediaries (Heinke, 2000) . When an investor (principal), who is seeking for investment opportunities, and a borrower or issuer of a bond (agent) bargain, the borrower has a substantial informational advantage. He knows exactly how he is going to invest the borrowed money and he can, therefore, better evaluate the inherent risk of his future projects. In order to persuade investors to lend money, the issuer must pay a premium or credit spread which increases with the perceived risk and the issuer's probability of default. Whether the offered risk premium is fair is not transparent to the investor due to possible hidden intentions or hidden action by the issuer. The risk of moral hazard remains but it can be alleviated by rating agencies.
Rating agencies help evaluate the issuer's probability of default by rendering it tangible with the aid of the well-known letter grades (Cantor and Packer, 1994, p. 3) . Therefore, rating agencies screen borrowers for investors (2). In the original investor-pays model, the majority of the agencies' revenues consisted of subscription fees. Lewis Tappan, who founded the Mercantile Agency in 1841, developed a remuneration model in which the subscribers had to pay annual fees in order to get the relevant information, which was later adopted by the 'big three' (Olegario, 2001, p. 13) . In Tappan's original model, fees ranged from $50 per year for companies with revenues under $50,000 up to $300 per year for big firms that generated revenues higher than $400,000 (Olegario, 2001, p. 13) . Jiang et al. (2012, p. 609) argue that the investor-pays model is 'free of any conflicts of interest and helped build [. . .] agencies' reputations for integrity'. Yet one should take into account that some investors aim at low ratings so as to receive higher premiums, which leads to a potential conflict of interest in this model (Johansson, 2010, p. 5) . Since agencies are paid by investors, they might focus on the investor's welfare rather than on the issuer's. Thus, the risk of 'too negative' ratings is inherent in this remuneration model. Furthermore, the rating information, which is nowadays public, would again become investors' private information, leading to a decline in market transparency (Mork€ otter and Westerfeld, 2008, p. 396) .
Rating agencies use quantitative as well as qualitative data in order to evaluate an issuer's creditworthiness (3). For this service, most rating agencies are currently paid by issuers of bonds. They usually receive approximately two or three basis points of the issued amount yearly (Partnoy, 1999, p. 653 ) but payments of fixed sums are also possible. On the one hand, rating agencies in both remuneration models are issuers' agents and have an informational advantage concerning the rating process and the 'formula' with which the rating is finally determined. On the other hand, they are also issuers' principals since they are completely dependent on the correctness and the soundness of the supplied data and information.
Heinke (2000, p. 320) sees three major reasons for the presence of conflicts of interest in the issuer-pays model. First, he lists the aspect of (economic) dependency as the agencies are dependent on the fees issuers pay for the rating. This implies the risk of favorable ratings in order to keep up the business contact. If this argumentation is used with regard to the investor-pays model, the opposite might be true. Second, he mentions self-interest and insufficient use of resources. By this, Heinke (2000) means that rating agencies are profit-oriented companies and act as such. They might aim at minimizing costs instead of maximizing quality of ratings, thereby not maintaining enough resources so as to guarantee timely and profound evaluations. This can also apply to the investor-pays model. Third, Heinke (2000) refers to multiple ratings. The US Securities and Exchange Commission demands ratings of at least two of the 'big three' agencies for securities that are publicly sold. According to Everling (1996, p. 8) , this is an indication for missing confidence in single ratings.
Given these conflicts of interest inherent in the current issuer-pays model and the inglorious role rating agencies played in the financial crisis from 2007, some experts call for drastic measures such as nationalization of rating agencies (Theilacker, 2009 ). When taking into account such arrangements, one should consider that publicly financed ratings can also reveal substantial problems: Governments have great interest in saving system-relevant companies or banks and positive evaluations might be a (cost-efficient) means of protection in this context (Johansson, 2010, p. 5) . Nonetheless, a publicly financed rating agency might function as a benchmark for private companies and an additional profound opinion could substantially enhance market transparency.
To sum up, the existing conflicts of interest in the issuer-pays model could induce biased, i.e., more favorable ratings. If this conflict of interest is disclosed, investors, who rely on ratings should discount this biased information in order to come closer to the truth. Caine et al. (2005) show experimentally that disclosure can have paradox effects. They find that people do not sufficiently discount biased information even if the underlying conflict of interest is known. In their setting, disclosure even exaggerated the bias since advisors felt 'morally licensed' and 'strategically elated' to overstate their assessments even more. They conclude that disclosure alone cannot cure issues that are induced by conflicts of interest and that disclosure may even worsen matters. Transferred to the problem described above, the findings pictured by Caine et al. (2005) could lead to 'too positive' ratings in the issuer-pays model. On the other hand, disclosure of the underlying remuneration model and the sums being paid might lead investors to behave more cautiously but not cautiously enough. They might anticipate ratings to be too positive but still demand too small risk premiums. With regard to issuers' behavior, the conflicts of interest in the issuer-pays model and disclosure could lead to moral hazard.
The three remuneration models presented in this section (issuer-pays, investor-pays, public-pays) have not yet been put to a benchmark test with equal conditions. Furthermore, only very little empirical evidence on advantages and disadvantages of remuneration models of rating agencies exists in general (see Jiang et al., 2012) . By testing them in an experimental framework, we tried to analyze the effect of the remuneration model on rating agencies' evaluations and investors' as well as issuers' behavior without confounding factors and thus contribute to the heated discussion on conflicts of interest in the remuneration models of rating agencies.
EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our experimental set-up mainly resembles the one chosen by Kataria and Winter (2013) . They tested the effect of promises and incentives on assessments by adding a third player, the 'assessor', to a binary trust game. At the beginning of the game, the assessor had to evaluate whether a friend of his, the 'trustee', would return, given trust or whether he would commit a breach of confidence later in the game. This was possible since these two players were friends, and therefore knew each other well. The judgement was shared with the 'trustor' who had to make a decision whether to trust the 'trustee' or not. Kataria and Winter (2013) asked themselves whether it is possible to obtain adequate judgments from an assessor when conflicts of interest exist. They refer to the example of a professor who has to write a recommendation letter for one of his students. With their experimental set-up they succeeded in showing that assessor's promises to give an honest evaluation substantially decreases advantageous judgments. Kataria and Winter (2013) also tested the effect of pecuniary incentives. They found that when the assessor is presented the prospect of higher payoffs in case his judgement is correct, favorable evaluations are reduced to the same extent as by promises or oaths.
Set-up
Our experiment took place in June 2014 at the University of Kassel.
1 A total of 48 students of an Experimental Economics class took part who had worked 1. The instructions of the different treatments, the decision forms and the post experimental questionnaire can be found in the supplementary material of the online version.
together for two months in groups of at least four people each to prepare, conduct, analyze and present own experiments. Therefore, we could assign the role of rating agencies to participants who were able to assess the credibility of subjects in the role of issuers from the same group. The investors were recruited from the same seminar. Participants played at least one round as investor, issuer or rating agency and at most six rounds (in different roles). They knew that one round would be paid randomly. Besides having worked together, we needed participants who had the same gender (see also Kataria and Winter, 2013 , who tried to avoid gender effects). Only if these two conditions were fulfilled, participants would assume the roles of rating agency and issuer. Thus, the number of rounds participants could play depended on the size of the work group and the number of same-gender members of the respective group they had worked in. In case one couple who had actually worked together could not fulfill the condition of being of the same gender, we still let them play but excluded the data from our analysis afterward. This is the reason why the numbers of answers and participants and the number of dependent and independent observations differ between treatments. On average, participants earned 5.50 EUR in about 45 minutes. To avoid experimenter demand effects, participants of the seminar were unaware of the research background (and hypotheses) of the experiment; furthermore, we avoided the terms rating agency, investor and issuer throughout the experiment in order not to induce priming effects. Instead, we used neutral framing: player A for investor/trustor, B for issuer/trustee and C for rating agency/assessor. Figure 2 visualizes the set-up we used to examine the effect of the remuneration model of rating agencies on their evaluations and investors' and issuers' Remuneration Models of Rating Agencies behavior. The rating agencies' payoffs are in the first row, the investors' payoffs in the second and the issuers' payoffs in the third row. At first, the rating agency, i.e., the assessor, gave a positive or negative judgement concerning the estimated behavior of the issuer, i.e., the trustee. The investor, i.e., the trustor, received the judgement and had to make a decision whether to trust the issuer or not. Finally, the issuer decided whether he wanted to return trust or not, not knowing how the investor and the rating agency had decided beforehand.
In our experiment, we used three treatments that differed concerning the rating agency's payment. First, we analyzed a remuneration model in which rating agencies are publicly financed. In this baseline, the agency received its remuneration (6.50 ECU 2 ) solely from the experimenter. Second, we tested the investorpays model. Here, the rating agency was paid by the experimenter (5 ECU) and by the investor (trustor) (1.50 ECU). Third, we examined the issuer-pays model where the agency was paid by the experimenter (5 ECU) and by the issuer (trustee) (1.50 ECU). Investors and issuers did not directly pay the amount, but the 1.50 ECU were deducted from their final payoff before participants of the experiment were paid out.
As in Kataria and Winter (2013) , we also used strategy eliciting of trustees/issuers in order to obtain enough data on their decisions and the correctness of the agencies'/assessors' evaluations since the correctness of evaluations is also an indicator of the quality of a remuneration model. In contrast to Kataria and Winter (2013) , our agency was partially paid by our issuers or investors respectively, not solely by the experimenter. Yet we chose the same amounts Kataria and Winter (2013) used (always 6.5 ECU for the assessor, at most 7 ECU for the trustor and at most 9 ECU for the trustee, depending on the treatment). Investors and issuers did not pay the full 6.50 ECU to the rating agency player in the investor-or the issuer-pays treatment because players in our experiment did not receive a show up fee which they could use for this purpose. Thus, a direct paying of 6.50 ECU would have led to negative payoffs. We chose 1.50 ECU as a 'rating fee' because this amount does not change the original incentive structure of the experiment by Kataria and Winter (2013) when comparing treatments. For example, in case the investor mistrusts the issuer, both get 5 ECU in the publicpays treatment. In the investor-pays model, the investor has to deduct 1.50 ECU and thus receives 3.50 ECU in the end. This amount still exceeds the 3 ECU the investor gets in the public-pays treatment in case he trusts and the issuer does not return trust (see Figure 2) . Independent of the agency's rating, the subgameperfect Nash equilibrium in every treatment is to mistrust the issuer (as an investor) and not to return trust to the investor (as an issuer). Yet if we take into account the probability that the issuer returns trust (p), the expected payoff for the investor who trusts amounts to 7p + 3(1 À p) ECU in the public-pays and issuer-pays models and 5.5p + 1.5(1 À p) ECU in the investor-pays model. The payoff of investors who do not trust is 5 ECU in the public-pays and issuer-pays models and 3.50 ECU in the investor-pays model. That means, in all the three treatments p has to be larger than 0.5 so that the payoff for trusting the issuer is higher than the payoff for not trusting. The investor's belief about p is likely to be highly dependent on the rating of the agency. We expect that positive (nega-2. 1 ECU equals 1 EUR. tive) ratings lead to beliefs about p that are higher (lower) than 0.5. Therefore, positive (negative) ratings should lead to trust (mistrust) of the investor.
Our pool of participants consisted of students who had worked together beforehand but who did not necessarily regard each other as friends, which also was a precondition in Kataria and Winter (2013) . Thereby, we could assess evaluations that are more closely related to our context. Furthermore, our participants played at least one and at most six rounds instead of always just one round as in the experiment conducted by Kataria and Winter (2013) . This was possible because rating agencies and issuers changed roles over the course of the experiment. This means that a player could assume the role of the 'rating agency' in the first round but had to assume the role of the 'issuer' in the second round, giving an evaluation of the trustworthiness of the player who had 'rated' him before. Thereby, we could gather more (dependent) observations from the same group. To avoid reciprocity effects between rounds, we used stranger matching (with the constraint that issuers and agencies knew each other) and did not provide feedback after each round. To avoid experimenter demand effects, players did not change between treatments.
Results
First, we analyzed the share of positive assessments by rating agencies ('assessors'). At 80%, the share of positive assessments was largest in the issuer-pays treatment in which the rating agency (assessor) was paid by the experimenter and the issuer (trustee). 3 In the investor-pays and the public-pays treatment, this share was slightly lower, at 75%. Yet neither Fisher exact tests nor Mann-Whitney U-tests (both two-sided) reveal any differences in assessment by treatment: While the share of positive decisions is based on all positive decisions in the respective treatments, we only used independent observations in the tests -In Mann-Whitney U-tests, we took the averages of positive assessments per subject and in Fisher exact tests, we compared the number of subjects (by treatment) who gave a negative assessment at least once and who gave a positive assessment at least once respectively. 4 In Kataria and Winter's (2013) study, 89% of all assessors in the treatment without incentives for their evaluations gave a positive assessment. This treatment can be compared to our baseline (75% in public-pays). This difference might be explained by the fact that in our experiment assessor (rating agency) and trustee (issuer) did not necessarily regard each other as friends but as colleagues who had worked together beforehand. Leising et al. (2010) found that people who like persons they have to evaluate describe them more positively on average than if they just knew each other.
Although investors seldom doubted the rating agencies' assessments in the investor-pays treatment, it is interesting to know that the share of correct ratings was actually lowest in this model (44%). It was highest in the public-pays treatment (63%). In the issuer-pays model, about 52% of all evaluations were found to be correct. Yet these differences are not significant according to Mann-Whitney U-tests that compare the shares of correct assessments per subject and according to Fisher exact tests that compare the number of subjects who were always correct and who were correct at least once respectively. Given the high shares of positive ratings across all treatments, the different results of correct ratings by treatment are mainly driven by the high share of trustful trustees in the public-pays treatment. Figure 3 displays the shares of investors (trustors) who followed the advice of rating agencies; i.e., who granted trust after positive assessments and who did not grant trust after negative assessments. Figure 3 shows that the assessors' judgments were a crucial criterion for investors' decisions. Yet, especially in the issuer-pays model, the shares of following the agency's advice are lower than expected: Obviously, a positive (negative) assessment did not always result in a belief about p, the probability that the issuer returns trust, that is higher (lower) than 0.5. The light gray bars stand for the percentage of decisions to trust the issuer on basis of a positive assessment from the rating agency. For example, in the investor-pays model 83% (10 out of 12) of the decisions are positive ('trust') when the rating agency declares the issuer as trustworthy beforehand. On the other hand, four of four investors decide not to trust the issuer when the rating agency uttered a negative evaluation. Most participants decided to grant trust when the assessor uttered a positive assessment in the public-pays and the investor-pays treatment. However, the assessors' positive judgments were often doubted in the issuer-pays model. Negative assessments were a crucial criterion not to trust issuers in the investorpays and the public-pays variant, whereas investors did not seem to take the rating agencies' judgments too seriously in the issuer-pays treatment. Merely 50% (9 of 18) trusted their positive judgments and 40% (2 of 5) of those who received a negative judgement acted according to this evaluation. Investors do not seem to trust rating agencies in the issuer-pays model in both ways. Taking positive and negative judgments together, investors followed the advice of rating agencies more often if they paid for the assessment: In the investor-pays model, investors followed the advice in 88% of their decisions, in the public-pays model in 61% and in the issuer-pays model in 48%. According to a two-sided MannWhitney U-test, the shares per subject of following the agency's advice (positive or negative) is significantly higher in the investor-pays than in the issuer-pays model at the 10% level (Z = À1.80, p = 0.07). The proportion of issuers (trustees) who returned trust to investors (trustors) (= probability p) was 38% (issuer-pays), 63% (public-pays) and 28% (investorpays) respectively. 5 In all three treatments, the probabilities that issuers return trust are not significantly different from 0.5 according to Wilcoxon signed rank tests. The difference between the issuer-pays and the investor-pays treatment was not significant. However, according to two-sided Fisher exact tests, the share of issuers who returned trust at least once in the public-pays model (92%) differed significantly from the respective shares in the investor-pays model (44%) and issuer-pays model (46%) (p = 0.02 and 0.03 respectively). Compared to their ratings, the behavior of issuers is much worse than anticipated by rating agenciesespecially in the issuer -and investor-pays treatments. Wilcoxon signed rank tests confirm this impression: Assessments and behavior differ highly significantly in the issuer-pays treatment (Z = 2.89, p < 0.01) and in the investor-pays treatment (Z = 2.33, p = 0.02) but not significantly in the public-pays treatment.
We asked investors (trustors) and issuers (trustees) in all treatments to tell us how much they would be willing to pay for the rating agency's (assessor's) evaluation in order to assess the value participants assigned to the rating. We stressed that this was only a voluntary additional information which would have no consequences for their payoffs. Figure 4 visualizes the average willingness to pay of investors and issuers in the respective treatments. Investors were willing to pay the most for the additional information in the issuer-pays model (1.47 euro on average) -significantly more than in the public-pays (0.67 euro on average, twosided Mann-Whitney U-test: Z = 2.34, p = 0.02) and in the investor-pays treatment (0.31 euro on average, Z = 2.47, p = 0.01).
6 Issuers' willingness to pay was highest in the investor-pays treatment (1.08 euro) which was, however, not significantly different from the other treatments.
In order to better explain the decisions of our investors and issuers, we added a post experimental questionnaire and conducted multivariate analyses with the help of this data. In the post experimental questionnaire, besides feedback questions, we measured trust by means of the trust construct of the German SocioEconomic Panel Study (SOEP) (Naef and Schupp, 2009 ). Duff and Einig (2009) showed that trust is an important determinant of the quality of the relationship between rating agencies, investors and issuers. Further, we measured financial risk taking with the German versions of the DOSPERT-subscales 'Gambling' and 'Investing' (Blais and Weber, 2006) . The regressions also comprise treatment 5. Number of independent observations: Issuer-pays (N = 12), Baseline (N = 13), Investor-pays (N = 9). 6. Although we stressed that WTPs do not affect subjects' payoffs, answers may have been strategically biased in a way that participants announced lower WTPs in treatments where they actually had to pay for the rating agencies.
dummies, the willingness to pay (WTP) for ratings in EUR and the evaluation of the rating agencies (0 = negative rating, 1 = positive rating). In our probit regressions of Table 1 , we used the investor's decision to follow the advice of the rating agency (1) and the issuer's decision to return the trust of the investor (2) as the dependent variables. In (1), we see that, compared to the public-pays (baseline) treatment, investors more often acted according to the rating agencies' evaluations in the investor-pays treatment. This is in line with our Notes: Reference category: public-pays; SEs are adjusted for 22 clusters (1) and 32 clusters (2) in subjects, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; marginal effects at sample averages.
analysis in Figure 3 . Additionally, the regression shows that, ceteris paribus, investors followed the advice of rating agencies more often in case of positive assessments. Further control variables did not seem to play an important role for investors' choices. Specification (2) shows that, compared to our baseline, issuers more often did not return investor's trust in the issuer-and investor-pays model. Furthermore, it shows that issuers returned trust more often if they generally trusted other people and if they were less risk averse. The WTP and the agency's assessment did not significantly explain the issuer's decision.
Discussion
In light of agency theory outlined above, one might expect that the share of positive ratings is highest in the issuer-pays treatment. As indicated in the result section, the share of positive ratings in the issuer-pays treatment exceeded the respective shares of the other treatments by 5 percentage points. Yet this difference is not significant. This could be explained by the fact that the amount of money the rating agency received was always the same in all treatments and that merely the distribution changed. Therefore, rating agencies had no monetary incentive to assign favorable or overcautious ratings. Kataria and Winter (2013) found that monetary incentives lead to a substantial reduction in positive assessments in their experimental setting. The assessor received 10 euro in case his evaluation was correct and 3 euro if not. If we had incentivized the rating agencies' assessment monetarily, especially in the investor-pays model and the public-pays treatment, we might have seen less favorable evaluations on average.
We found that investors trust rating agencies' evaluations more in the investorpays than in the issuer-pays treatment. One reason for this can be that they had to pay 1.50 ECU for the information, and therefore valued it more highly. Furthermore, investors might mistrust the agency's assessment of an issuer when the issuer pays for it. Another explanation can be that investors became more risk-seeking after having paid 1.50 ECU and wanted to gamble for higher payoffs which they could only receive by choosing to trust the issuer, hoping that he would return trust. Thus, the investor-pays model has the favorable attribute that investors indeed value the information provided by the rating agencies. Unfortunately, this information is not reliable: In this treatment, the share of correct ratings is actually lowest which is driven by the low percentage of trustful trustees (issuers).
On the other hand, investors mistrusted the agencies' assessments most in the issuer-pays model. In the instructions of all treatments, every participant was informed how the rating agencies' payoff was composed. In anticipation of biased evaluations, investors might have discounted this advice, subsequently leading to a lower share of investors who granted trust. Caine et al. (2011) claim that this discounting is often not sufficient when conflicts of interest are disclosed since the evaluators feel morally licensed to exaggerate even more. Our findings point in a similar direction. Issuers received about the same evaluations in the issuer-pays as in the public-pays treatment but issuers more often behaved unfairly (i.e., they did not return trust) in the issuer-pays model. This morally hazardous behavior might have been motivated by the remuneration structure. Issuers had to pay 1.50 ECU for the evaluation, which the investor received from Remuneration Models of Rating Agencies the rating agency. In order to retract this payment, they might have been inclined not to return trust so as to maximize their payoff. In our experiment, the most unfair behavior of issuers was found in the investor-pays model where merely 28% of all issuers returned trust. The share of trustees returning trust is a relevant figure in trust games in general. With regard to our research question this is also an indicator of the quality of the remuneration model. On one hand, it shows that issuers behave more fairly in our public-pays treatment than in the other treatments. On the other hand, it also reveals that issuers might feel morally licensed not to return trust in case they pay the rating agency. Interestingly, the share of issuers who return trust is least in the investor-pays model. This might be the case because investors and issuers might regard each other as opponents in this set-up. Furthermore, some players B (issuers) gave the feedback that they chose not to return trust in order to maximize their profits.
If we played more rounds with constant roles, the rating agencies would have the possibility to build up a good reputation. It would thus be important to know whether their assessments were correct or not. Practically, the ratings issued by an agency are important but not the only indicator investors should base their investment decision on. Against this background, ratings are important but it is even more important how market participants react to ratings and rating changes. Therefore, our finding that investors value ratings more if they have to pay for them has the character of a two-edged sword. On one hand, this result shows that rating agencies can enhance their reputation among investors when the conflict of interest between rating agency and issuer is reduced. On the other hand, the quality of ratings does not necessarily become better.
The investors' willingness to pay for a rating also differed by treatment. Investors were willing to pay the most for assessments in the issuer-pays treatment. Here, they might have expected the most striking conflicts of interest. This underlines the assumption that investors assign a value to this assessment which helps them make their investment decision. They were willing to pay substantially less in the investor-pays treatment. Issuers' willingness to pay for an assessment of their potential behavior did not differ by treatment. Nonetheless, it was positive for every treatment and highest in the investor-pays model. Issuers seem to appreciate the opportunity to send signals to investors in order to convince them of their soundness. The average willingness to pay of issuers was lowest in the issuer-pays model, in which they actually had to pay 1.50 ECU for the rating. The same pattern emerged when we compared investors' willingness to pay in the public-pays and in the investor-pays treatment: Investors exhibited a higher willingness to pay on average when the public, i.e., the experimenter, pays for the rating.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our experimental findings suggest that the remuneration model does not have substantial influence on the rating agencies' assessments. Although rating agencies tend to give more favorable ratings in the issuer-pays treatment, these differences are not statistically significant. But the remuneration model seems to have consequences for the other market participants' behavior. Specifically, issuers behave more unfairly when they or investors pay for ratings rather than when ratings are publicly financed. In the issuer-pays treatment, the reason for this observation could be the issuers' aspiration level of payoffs or them feeling morally licensed to behave more unfairly since they paid for the rating. In the investor-pays treatment, issuers might suspect mistrust of the investors and/or conflicts of interest between investor and rating agency.
Another interesting finding is that investors follow the assessor's advice more often than if issuers pay for the additional information. 7 Therefore, the (practically almost impossible) return from the issuer-pays to the investor-pays model could have beneficial effects. First, it could enhance the quality of ratings since the degree of conflicts of interest is regarded as lowest in this model (Jiang et al., 2012, p. 609) . Pagano and Volpin (2010) propose to return to the investor-pays model in order to reduce credit ratings failures. However, we do not find any significant differences with regard to a higher correctness of ratings in the investorpays model. 8 Second, these ratings (that are likely to be least biased) seem to have the greatest acceptance by the investors. If correct ratings are more accepted and more reliable, this could help discriminating 'lemons' from 'plums' in debt markets. Vice versa, if issuers pay for the ratings, investors do not trust the information. In our setting, this holds for positive and negative assessments likewise which makes the rating worthless and impairs market transparency.
All in all, the public-pays treatment performs a little better than the investorand the issuer-pays models. In our public-pays treatment, issuers more often return trust than in the other treatments. Moreover, investors do not (blindly) trust the rating agencies' assessments like in the investor-pays model but reach their evaluations with (healthy) skepticism. Besides these findings, the share of correct ratings is highest in the public-pays treatment -but not significantly different to the other treatments. The unfair behavior of issuers in the issuer-pays and in the investor-pays treatments speaks against these two remuneration models in our experimental setting. Against this background, publicly financed ratings seem to be a way to alleviate the conflicts of interest in the rating process. But, as mentioned above, governments as potential payers of ratings also have strategic interests. Good ratings (which are not overly doubted by market participants) can be a cost-efficient means to protect ailing system-relevant companies, especially banks, to survive in times of crisis. Therefore, it would be too much of a good thing to nationalize rating agencies as postulated by Theilacker (2009) . However, ratings published by an additional publicly financed rating agency could function as a benchmark although this agency would have to face the challenge to build up a good reputation quickly.
Practically, a return to the investor-pays model would be difficult. Ratings are more or less public goods nowadays because the information can quickly spread or be resold. Therefore, a great share of revenues of the rating agencies would be at stake, leading to cost-cuts and declining quality. A change from the recent issuer-pays to a public-pays approach might have similar consequences. One way to incentivize correctness of ratings is to introduce legal liability of rating agencies for their assessments. For example, Partnoy (2009) asks to disestablish rating agencies' exemption from liability for their ratings. He argues that this is necessary because of the immense influence of their judgments, especially with regard to institutional investors' portfolio structuring. Ratings come under the freedom of speech as their evaluations are recognized as 'opinions' despite their regulatory use. Kataria and Winter (2013) showed that the share of favorable ratings decreases when monetary incentives for correctness come into play. With the help of monetary consequences for the correctness of ratings, the effect of legal liability could be tested in our three treatments. Angelova and Regner (2013) incentivize truthful advice in a deception game and find that voluntary payments to the advisor combined with a bonus afterward increase the quality of advice.
In our view, the strategic components of institutional decision making of rating agencies, issuers and investors can be analyzed with individual decision making in experiments. In our experiment, we used neutral framing; we do not claim that behavior of our subjects is directly comparable to that of the institutions. Yet these institutions can be affected by the same behavioral effects as they find themselves in similar strategic situations. To experimentally account for the fact that investors, issuers and rating agencies are institutions instead of individuals, future research could apply group decisions instead of individual decision making Sutter, 2005, 2007) .
Rating agencies are highly dependent on their reputation which de facto represents their capital (Dittrich, 2007) . Our experiment is a one-shot game where rating agencies do not have the possibility to build up a reputation. Results of previous rounds were not made public and the group constellation changed from round to round. In future research, our experiment could be played several rounds with constant roles. The results of each round could be announced and rating agencies would have the chance to build up a reputation for future rounds. Further, to enhance the external validity of our results even more, field experiments of different remuneration models of rating agencies would be desirable. However, historical evidence is rare (Jiang et al., 2012) and interesting data from issuers and investors are hard to obtain. Our results suggest taking a closer look at investors and issuers as they are more affected by the rating agencies' remuneration model than the agencies themselves.
